The median voter is dead – long live political moderation! by Bronk, Richard
The	median	voter	is	dead	–	long	live	political
moderation!
Ever	since	the	financial	crisis,	centrist	and	establishment	politics	has	been	suffering	a	deepening	loss	of	legitimacy
and	voter	loyalty	in	Europe	and	the	United	States.	The	median-voter	strategy	of	the	Blair	and	Clinton	years	has
been	criticised	for	good	reason,	writes	Richard	Bronk.	But	might	political	moderation	be	about	to	make	a
comeback	as	the	world	faces	up	to	unprecedented	challenges	on	multiple	fronts?
The	vote	for	Brexit	and	the	election	of	Donald	Trump	in	2016	seemed	to	confirm	the	ascendency	of	what	Jonathan
Hopkin	calls	‘anti-system	politics’	–	also	reflected	in	the	recent	startling	success	of	new	challenger	parties	across
the	EU.	But	have	we	been	too	ready	to	read	the	last	rites	over	political	moderation?
Still	dominant	in	Canada,	New	Zealand,	Scandinavia	and	much	of	south-east	Asia,	political	moderation	has	already
made	something	of	a	comeback	elsewhere	with	the	election,	for	example,	of	President	Macron	in	France	(2017),
New	Democracy	in	Greece	(2019),	and	Keir	Starmer	as	the	post-Corbyn	leader	of	the	UK	Labour	Party.	Moreover,
a	recent	IPSOS	poll	showed	that	significantly	more	UK	voters	identify	with	the	‘centre’	(34%)	than	with	either	the
‘left’	(24%)	or	‘right’	(25%)	of	a	notional	political	spectrum.	In	the	US,	the	first	week	in	November	will	confirm
whether	the	greatest	experiment	in	anti-system	politics	of	recent	years	will	end	with	the	election	of	the
quintessential	conciliatory	moderate,	Joe	Biden,	as	President.	If	it	does	so,	are	there	reasons	to	believe	that	might
be	part	of	a	growing	trend?
In	his	new	book,	Hopkin	argues	persuasively	that	anti-system	politics	has	been	a	natural	reaction	to	the	‘market
liberal	consensus’	shared	until	recently	by	all	mainstream	parties	–	a	consensus	that	narrowed	the	range	of	political
positions	‘to	the	point	where	voters	were	left	with	little	real	choice	at	election	time’.	When	the	financialised	version	of
global	capitalism	enabled	by	this	consensus	ended	in	the	financial	crash	of	2008	and	long	years	of	rising	inequality
and	insecurity,	voters	were	primed	to	look	for	radical	alternatives	to	the	status	quo.	Parties	pursuing	a	median-voter
strategy	–	along	with	the	main	institutions	of	the	state	and	most	market	participants	–	were	locked	into	what	Wade
Jacoby	and	I	have	called	an	‘analytical	monoculture’	that	left	them	blind	to	problems	that	are	not	articulated	in	the
language	of	standard	economics	and	risk	management.
In	‘Angrynomics’	–	an	exploration	of	the	positive	role	of	moral	outrage	and	the	damaging	effects	of	tribal	anger	in
politics	–	Mark	Blyth	and	Eric	Lonergan	argue	that	‘anodyne,	identity-free,	political	centrism’	created	a	‘vacuum’	that
was	bound	to	be	filled:	anger	was	inevitable	when	(constrained	by	the	apparently	ineluctable	logic	of	global
capitalism)	parties	in	power	progressively	abandoned	previous	commitments	to	protect	their	citizens	from	the
uncertainty,	anxiety,	and	costs	associated	with	rapid	economic	change.	Facing	what	Zygmunt	Bauman	calls	‘liquid
modernity’	–	the	omnipresent	uncertainty	resulting	from	a	compulsive	obsession	with	modernisation	and	continual
deregulation	–	voters	became	increasingly	anxious.	And,	sensing	that	governments	are	trapped	in	Dani	Rodrik’s
‘trilemma’	–	where	they	can	deliver	only	two	of	three	goals	(national	sovereignty,	globalisation	and	democracy)	–
and	have	largely	devolved	decision-making	to	unelected	and	often	supranational	technocratic	agencies,	many
voters	turned	against	the	whole	political	system.
In	the	‘Epistemics	of	Populism’,	Jacoby	and	I	argued	that	the	economic	indeterminacy	implied	by	rapid
technological	change,	deregulation,	and	complex	interconnected	global	networks	–	and	the	correspondingly	high
levels	of	uncertainty	and	insecurity	experienced	by	citizens	–	has	also	provided	fertile	conditions	for	the	populist
approach	to	politics	that	some	anti-system	parties	have	successfully	adopted.	In	particular,	the	unpredictability	and
openness	of	the	future	have	undermined	the	credibility	of	experts,	while	encouraging	an	‘arms	race	of	rhetorical
hyperbole’	as	political	actors	scramble	to	establish	their	narratives	and	‘facts’	as	key	determinants	of	the	beliefs	and
actions	of	the	electorate.	The	difficulty	of	holding	individuals	responsible	for	the	failures	of	a	complex	economic
system	has	also	allowed	populists	to	blame	whichever	group	of	outsiders	suits	their	political	interests.
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Joe	Biden	at	a	campaign	event	in	Nevada	on	9	October	2020,	Credit:	Joe	Biden	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
Given	all	this,	why	might	the	politics	of	moderation	make	a	comeback	at	the	very	moment	when	the	Covid-19	crisis
is	further	highlighting	and	increasing	the	inequalities	in	society	that	leave	many	perilously	vulnerable?
Part	of	the	answer	is	the	simple	power	of	anti-incumbency	politics.	As	Hopkin	notes,	the	immediate	reaction	to	the
financial	crisis	was	to	vote	out	incumbent	centrist	parties	in	favour	of	alternative	parties	of	the	establishment	centre
–	as	for	example,	when	the	Conservative-Liberal	coalition	led	by	David	Cameron	replaced	Gordon	Brown’s	Labour
government.	Only	when	all	elements	of	the	political	centre	had	failed	to	address	their	concerns	did	electors	risk
voting	for	‘anti-system’	alternatives	–	such	as	Syriza	in	Greece	or	UKIP	(and	their	Brexit	policy)	in	the	UK.	By	the
same	logic	it	may	follow	that,	as	anti-system	(and	often	populist)	governments	are	in	turn	seen	to	flounder	in	their
management	of	crises,	anti-incumbency	may	work	against	the	new	players	themselves.
This	is	also	true	for	several	deeper	reasons:	first,	the	euro	crisis,	the	Covid	crisis,	and	the	UK’s	Brexit	divorce	from
the	EU	and	Single	Market	have	all	presented	enormous	challenges	to	governments	in	safeguarding	the	welfare	of
their	citizens	and	managing	attendant	economic	shocks.	For	all	the	boosterism	rhetoric	of	Johnson	and	Trump,
these	practical	challenges	are	not	easily	met	when	the	leaders	involved	are	systematically	denigrating	and
disrupting	the	very	administrative	institutions	and	bodies	of	experts	that	they	must	rely	on	to	manage	change.
Attempts	to	replace	the	accumulated	wisdom	of	established	institutions	with	government	by	tweet	or	by	the
application	of	algorithms	sponsored	and	championed	by	special	advisers	have	not	been	notably	successful.	Voters
have	noticed	that	what	works	to	win	electoral	campaigns	does	not	necessarily	solve	practical	policy	problems.
Secondly,	the	functional	need	for	anti-system	parties	was	to	provide	a	shock	to	a	non-responsive	political	system
that	was	unwilling	or	incapable	of	addressing	the	suffering	and	anxieties	endured	by	much	of	the	population.	But
the	Covid-19	pandemic	–	combined	with	the	growing	climate	crisis	–	is	increasingly	forcing	even	mainstream	parties
to	think	the	previously	unthinkable	and	refashion	the	rules	of	economic	policy	and	markets	to	address	burgeoning
inequality	and	hardship.
At	the	same	time,	voters	who	are	increasingly	alarmed	by	existential	threats	from	the	pandemic	and	climate	change
may	have	a	diminishing	appetite	for	a	mode	of	insurrectionary	and	revolutionary	politics	that	further	increases
instability	and	uncertainty.	As	in	wartime,	or	during	post-war	reconstruction,	voters	may	crave	stability,	competence,
and	reassurance	over	revolutionary	zeal.
Hopkin	intriguingly	compares	anti-system	parties	to	‘anti-bodies’	that	help	build	resistance	to	the	inequalities	and
injustices	of	market	liberalism.	But	to	use	a	topical	Covid	analogy,	the	body-politic	(or	patient)	can	be	killed	by	an
over-zealous	immune	response.	In	the	end,	it	is	the	system	infected	with	market	liberalism	(and	consequent
pathologies	of	inequality	and	insecurity)	that	must	organise	a	response	to	the	pathologies	if	the	patient	is	to	survive.
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Another	reason	why	the	sort	of	political	moderation	exemplified	by	Biden	and	Starmer	may	once	again	be	appealing
to	voters	(following	years	of	increasingly	raucous	left-wing	insurgency	in	their	respective	parties)	can	ironically	best
be	explained	by	unpacking	why	the	median-voter	model	of	politics	(personified	by	New	Labour	and	the	Third	Way)
was	fundamentally	misconceived.	That	model	focused	on	a	supposedly	‘typical’	or	‘representative’	voter,	thereby
ignoring	the	heterogeneity	of	preferences	and	interests.	More,	crucially,	it	assumed	that	political	preferences	could
be	placed	on	a	single	continuum	(and	that	disparate	underlying	values	could	be	converted	to	a	single	scale),	so	that
governments	could	satisfy	the	preferences	of	a	simple	majority	of	the	people	and	calculate	the	optimum	set	of
policy	trade-offs.	Government	became	a	technocratic	enterprise.
This	median-voter	model	of	politics	drained	much	of	the	significance	from	the	cross-cutting	value	conflicts	that
underlie	the	complex	preferences	of	voters.	In	particular,	by	assuming	that	different	values	or	goals	are
commensurable	(and	can	be	placed	on	a	single	scale	of	value	or	single	continuum	of	preference-bundles)	it
underestimated	how	contested	and	unstable	are	the	trade-offs	between	different	goals	–	such	as	freedom	and
security,	efficiency	and	equality,	medical	health	and	economic	growth.	There	is	no	one	right	and	rational	set	of
trade-offs	for	an	individual	or	society.	The	political	choices	made	define	the	identity	of	a	body	politic,	and	voters
understandably	care	deeply	about	them	and	frequently	change	their	mind.
The	ultimate	problem	for	–	and	glory	of	–	any	successful	form	of	politics	is	then	that	it	must	articulate	and	mediate
between	a	variety	of	values	and	interests,	while	allowing	voters	and	their	representatives	to	understand	the
practical	implications	of	the	trade-offs	they	choose.
Such	articulation	of	–	and	mediation	between	–	different	and	conflicting	incommensurable	values	and	interests	was
largely	absent	in	the	catch-all	policy	offerings	of	Third-Way	consensus	politics	and	no	longer	catered	for	by	pre-
2016	centrist	political	parties	with	declining	memberships	and	voter	involvement.	But	it	is	also	inadequately	catered
for	by	the	dialogue	of	the	deaf	that	has	characterised	the	recent	polarised	politics	of	the	US	and	UK	–	where	parties
captured	by	idealogues	speak	only	to	their	increasingly	homogenous	base	(and	in	some	cases	actually	expel	their
own	members	for	disagreeing	with	their	respective	leaderships).	If	politics	is	to	produce	innovative	answers	to	the
novel	challenges	presented	by	concurrent	crises,	gain	the	support	of	a	diverse	electorate,	and	negotiate
compromises	and	trade-offs	between	different	interests	and	incommensurable	goals,	then	it	must	enable	respectful
dialogue	between	different	groups	of	voters.
Sensing	this,	voters	in	majoritarian	(first-past-the-post)	electoral	systems	may	once	again	be	favouring	political
parties	that	have	the	internal	mechanisms	and	leaderships	(arguably	provided	by	Biden	and	Starmer)	that	enable
negotiation	and	deliberative	debate	between	a	broad	range	of	interests,	values,	and	perspectives.	In	PR	systems,
by	contrast,	they	may	favour	moderate	parties	that	can	help	negotiate	coalitions	between	ideologically	diverse
blocs.	(For	those	unused	to	EU	politics,	think	of	Birgitte	Nyborg	in	the	TV	series,	Borgen).
The	radical	uncertainty	implied	by	the	complex	and	novel	challenges	now	facing	democracies	in	a	fragile	and
interdependent	world	may	also	end	up	increasing	the	emotional	appeal	of	narratives	of	political	moderation,	just	as
it	did	after	World	War	II.	Existential	uncertainty	may	make	voters	wary	once	again	of	simplistic	narratives	and
revolutionary	policies	and	increasingly	comfortable	with	the	pragmatic	politics	of	competence	and	the	sort	of
‘piecemeal’	social	engineering	championed	by	Karl	Popper.	In	other	words,	crisis	fatigue	may	cause	voters	to	shun
grand	solutions	with	unknowable	consequences	and	prefer	the	sort	of	incremental	reform	traditionally	associated
with	moderate	political	parties	of	left	and	right.	Uncertainty	may	also	increase	the	voter	appeal	of	the	decentralised
and	‘polycentric’	approach	that	Elinor	Ostrom	argued	has	the	best	chance	of	tackling	urgent	shared	problems	–	by
encouraging	diverse	experiments	in	living	that	engage	and	involve	ordinary	voters.	The	Metro	mayors	of	the	North
of	England	and	the	devolved	administrations	in	the	UK	battling	the	Covid	crisis	certainly	hope	so.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Joe	Biden	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
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